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Part 1: Reasons, Rationality and Reasoning
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| The first part will introduce different notions of rationality
found in the philosophical literature. We will introduce different "modes"
of practical and theoretical reasoning. |
| Lecture |
Date |
Content |
| 1 |
1/24 |
Introduction (version for printing). The
first lecture will introduce the main topics of the course. The readings for
this lecture are:
- Chapter 1 of [RC]: "Feasibility and Desirability"
- G. Harman. "Rationality" in: Reasoning, Meaning and Mind,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, pgs. 9 - 45, 1999. (this will be made
available in class)
- W. Spohn, The
Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality, Croatian Journal
of Philosophy, Volume 2, Issue 6, pp. 249 - 264, 2002.
|
| 2 |
1/31 |
Tutorial
Questions. This lecture will be led by Dominik Klein and will be a
tutorial focused on the basics of logic and probability theory. The students
will be given 30-40 minutes to think about five questions about probability
and logic (mostly puzzles and paradoxes analogous to the ones we discussed
over the past few weeks). (Of course, feel free to discuss the possible
solutions which each other.) Then, Dominik will discuss possible solutions
to the questions.
|
| 3 |
2/7 |
Modes of
Reasoning (version for
printing). This lecture goes into more detail about the complex
relationship between logic and reasoning. The readings for this lecture are:
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| 4 |
2/14 |
Practical
Reasoning (version for
printing). We discuss practical reasoning and what constitutes a
reason for action. The readings for this lecture are:
- G. Harman, “Practical Reasoning,” Review of Metaphysics 29, 431-463,
1976. (Also available in A. Mele (editor), Philosophy of
Action, Oxford Readings in Philosophy.
- B. Hooker and B. Streumer, Procedural
and Substantive Rationality, Chapter 4 in [HR]
- B. Williams, Internal and External Reasons in: [REAS]
(also see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article: Reasons
for Action: Internal vs. External)
- R. Jay Wallace, Practical
Reason, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008.
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Part 2: Theoretical and Practical Rationality
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| This part will examine basic questions about the nature of
rational beliefs. Why should rational (graded) beliefs conform to the laws
of probability? Why should an agent adopt the means to achieve her desired
ends? What is the relationship between the
laws of (classical) logic and rational belief? It is clearly not rational to
hold the belief that p and that not-p, but what about
deductive closure: if an agent believes p and that p
implies q (and is interested in whether q is true), should
the agent then believe q? How should a rational agent change her
beliefs over time?
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| Lecture |
Date |
Content |
| 5 |
2/21 |
Rational
Constraints on Beliefs. We start by discussing different models of
beliefs then we will analyze the Dutch Book arguments.
- D. Christensen, Chapter 2: Two Models of Belief in Putting
Logic in its Place (copies are available in my
pigeon hole)
- J. Joyce, Bayesianism
in [HR]
- I. Gilboa, Chapter 5: "Probability and Statistics", in [RC]
- D. Makinson, The
Paradox of the Preface, Analysis, 25: 205–207, 1965. (use
this for your 1-page discussion)
- I. Douven and T. Williamson, Generalizing
the Lottery Paradox, British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 54:4, pgs. 755 - 779, 2006.
|
| 6 |
2/28 |
The Dutch Book
Argument. We continue our discussion about rational constraints on
beliefs and discuss rational constraints for belief change. The take-home
midterm questions will be due before class on March 14.
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| |
3/7 |
No Class Scheduled
|
| 7 |
3/14 |
Normativity of
Rationality. We explore the nature of rational constraints. The
take-home midterm questions will be due before class on March 17.
- N. Kolodny, Why be
rational?, Mind, Vol. 114, pgs. 509 - 561, 2005.
- S. Robertson, Introduction in Spheres of Reason: New Essays in
the Philosophy of Normativity
- J. Way, The
Normativity of Rationality, Philosophy Compass, Volume 5,
Issue 12, pages 1057–1068, December 2010
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| |
3/21 |
No Class Scheduled
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Part 3: Rational Choice Theory
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Rational choice theory, the core of the economic approach to human behavior,
has
become an influential approach in all of the social sciences. What makes
individual
actions rational? Rational choice theory offers a very simple answer:
actions are
rational if they reflect the maximizing of a consistent preference ordering.
Is this a
plausible account of human behavior? How can it be defended? One measure of
the success of rational choice theory, perhaps, is for how long it has
been able to withstand criticism. Recent developments, especially in
behavioral
economics, however, have succeeded in putting the standard model under
pressure.
We will also examine different objections to the standard model of rational
choice.
|
| Lecture |
Date |
Content |
| 8 |
3/28 |
Class canceled due to illness
|
| 9 |
4/4 |
Instrumental Rationality and Utility
Theory. We will discuss the foundations of utility theory. The
readings for this lecture are:
- I. Gilboa, Chapter 2: "Utility Theory", in [RC]
- G. Gaus, Chapter 1: "Instrumental and Economic Rationality" and
Chapter 2: "Utility Theory" in [OPPE]
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| 10 |
4/11 |
Rational
Choice Theory. We will continue our discussion of rational choice
theory.
- I. Gilboa, Chapter 4: "Expected Utility" in [RC]
- R. M. Sainsbury, Section 1: Newcomb's Problem of Chapter 4:
Paradoxes in [REAS] (handed out in
class)
Another paper that is definitely worth reading (though is rather advanced)
is:
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Part 4: Rationality in Interaction
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John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern wrote in their
seminal book, often cited as the starting point of modern day game theory,
that "we
wish to find the mathematically complete principles which define 'rational
behavior' for the participants [in a game]" (pg. 31, Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, 1944). To
what
extent they and subsequent game theorists have succeeded in this lofty goal
is the subject of much debate. After introducing some basic concepts
in game theory, we will focus on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, which
seems to pose some problems for the instrumental conception of rationality.
Time-permitting,
we will also consider another important issue in the foundations of game
theory: the paradox of backwards induction, which seems to pose a problem
for the
key assumption that it is common knowledge that players "behave
rationally".
|
| Lecture |
Date |
Content |
| 13 |
4/18 |
Introduction to
Game Theory. This class will introduce some basic concepts of game
theory, focusing on games of coordination and the prisoner's dilemma.
- I. Gilboa, Chapter 7: "Games and Equilibrium" in [RC] (Copies
available in class)
- C. Bicchieri, Rationality
and Game Theory in [HR]
- G. Gaus, Chapter 4: "Game Theory" in [OPPE]
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| |
4/25 |
No Class Scheduled
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| 14 |
5/2 |
Game
Theory: Common Knowledge of Rationality. We will continue our
discussion of game theory focusing on the the underlying assumption of
common knowledge of rationality, the backwards induction paradox and finally
focus on issues that arise when trying to define the "best" outcome for a
group. You can choose any of the following papers for your 1-page summary.
- P. Pettit and R. Sugden, The Backward
Induction Paradox, Journal of Philosophy, 86:4,
pgs. 169 - 182, 1989.
- P. Vanderschraaf and G. Sillari Common
Knowledge in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2007. (focus on Section 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.5 and 4)
- S. Kuhn, Prisoner's
Dilemma in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
2007.
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Part 5: Group Rationality
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How can a group of "rational" individuals arrive at a rational choice? This
module will
introduce the key issues in social choice theory (eg., Arrow's
Theorem on the "impossibility" of a rational group decision procedure) and,
time-permitting,
related work on judgement aggregation.
|
| Lecture |
Date |
Content |
| 15 |
5/9 |
Introduction to Collective
Rationality. We will introduce the basic ideas of Social Choice
Theory (and Judgement Aggregation). You can
choose any of the following for your 1-page summary. Note that your 2-3
page proposal for your final paper is also due
before before this class.
- G. Gaus, Social Choice, Chapter 5 in [OPPE]
- I. Gilboa, Aggregation and Preferences, Chapter 6 in [RC]
- P. Pettit, Rationality,
Reasoning and Group Agency, Dialectica Vol. 61, No.
4 (2007), pp. 495–519
- E. Pacuit, Voting Methods, prepared
for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (under revision,
comments welcome!)
|
| 16 |
5/16 |
Fairness and Concluding Remarks. We
will finish our tour of social choice theory with a discussion of some key
issues in fair division. We will then conclude with a discussion of the
broad issues we touched on in this course.
The following papers provide nice surveys of the topics we discussed in this
course.
- L. Blume and D. Easley, Rationality
in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2007.
- I. Gilboa, Utility and Well-Being, Chapter 10 in [RC]
- W. Spohn, The
Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality, Croatian Journal
of Philosophy, Volume 2, Issue 6, pp. 249 - 264, 2002.
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October 2010
